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Abstract 
Large loaders are commonly used when handling solid biomass fuels.  A preventable accident took 
place in 2010, where the malfunction of a front-end wheel loader led to a dust explosion which killed 
the driver and destroyed the building.  The case offers an opportunity to examine the hazards of solid 
biomass, the accident investigation and any learning that subsequently took place. 
The paper argues that learning opportunities were missed repeatedly.  Significant root causes were not 
identified; principles of inherent safety in design were ignored; the hazardous area classification was 
based on flawed reasoning; the ATEX assessment was inadequate as it dealt only with electrical 
installations, ignoring work operations; and powered industrial trucks had not been recognized as a 
source of ignition.  Perhaps most importantly, guidelines for hazardous area classification for 
combustible dust are insufficiently developed and give ample room for potentially erroneous subjective 
individual judgment.  It is a contributing factor that combustible dust, although with great hazard 
potential, is not classified as a dangerous substance.  Accidents therefore fall outside the scope of 
systems designed to disseminate lessons learned and prevent future accidents.  
More attention to safety is needed for the renewable energy and environmentally friendly biomass pellet 
industry also to become sustainable from a worker safety perspective. 
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Research highlights 
• Wheel loader ignited wood dust, leading to flash fire and explosion 
• ATEX assessment inadequate, dealing only with electrical installations 
• Guidelines for ATEX zones for combustible dusts are insufficiently 
developed  
• Facility exploded 2002, 2010, root causes not identified, no evidence of 
learning 
• Future repeat explosion likely had facility not been closed down 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and purpose  
A layer of dust from solid biomass is a significant fire hazard and when fine 
dust particles become airborne in sufficient quantity they represent a serious 
explosion hazard.  A series of recent incidents have shaken the confidence of 
the biomass industry in the handling of these new fuels [1].  Insurance 
companies have warned the wood pellet industry that its performance must 
improve or else pellet plants will no longer be insurable [2]. 
Hedlund and Astad [3] argued that while wood dust hazards may have been 
grandfathered as tolerable risks in traditional operations such as saw mills, the 
large-scale use of solid biomass as a renewable and carbon dioxide neutral 
energy source presents new challenges.  The complexities that come with 
intensification, scale-up and handling of unprecedented quantities of solid 
biomass fuels call for increased attention.  The authors presented a list of recent 
major fires and serious explosions involving wood pellets and argued that the 
accident record indicates that wood pellets represent an emerging risk for which 
proper control strategies have yet to be developed.  They also argued that 
information sharing schemes are absent or deficient – that accident 
investigations, if carried out, often are kept internal and lessons learnt to 
prevent recurrence are not shared widely.  The authors observed that this is a 
familiar and age old problem across industries.  It may be that market 
participants for commercial reasons, reputation, cost or otherwise find 
information sharing unattractive.  Some sort of regulatory intervention is 
probably required to translate the seemingly straightforward ideal of sharing 
lessons learned into something workable in practice. 
This paper presents a case that would appear to confirm each of the concerns 
raised above.  In Denmark, a new facility started production in 2001 to 
manufacture environmentally friendly wood pellets for the domestic stoker 
market.  The paper argues that the wood dust hazards were not adequately 
controlled, seemingly because the hazards were not fully understood.  It may 
have been a contributing factor that wood dust is not classified as a dangerous 
substance.  After less than one year the facility experienced a very serious 
explosion.  Only due to sheer luck, nobody was injured.  The accident was 
insufficiently investigated and root causes were not identified.  No attempt was 
made to share information; in fact, the event has vanished from open sources.  
Eight years later the facility exploded again, this time fatally injuring one 
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employee.  Again, the accident was insufficiently investigated, root causes not 
identified and no information shared.  The case offers a text book example of 
the truism that if accidents are not investigated, and root causes not identified, 
accidents recur.  Had the company chosen to rebuild the facility, which this 
time they did not, a future repeat explosion would be likely. 
1.2 Hazards of wood dust 
Dust explosions have traditionally been difficult to deal with in industry.  Part 
of the problem lies with the limited general understanding of the complex 
mechanism of dust explosions among plant operating personnel as well as 
corporate management.  Abbasi and Abbasi [4] note that dust explosions pose 
the most serious and widespread of explosion hazards in the process industry 
alongside vapour cloud explosions (VCE) and boiling liquid expanding vapour 
explosions (BLEVE).  Dust explosions almost always lead to serious financial 
losses in terms of damage to facilities and down time.  They also often cause 
serious injuries to personnel, and fatalities. 
Dust explosions can either be primary or secondary.  A primary dust explosion 
occurs when a dust suspension within a container, room, or piece of equipment 
is ignited and explodes.  A secondary explosion occurs when dust, which has 
been allowed to settle and accumulate on floors or other surfaces, is made 
airborne by the pressure wave of primary explosion and subsequently ignited 
by the slower moving flame front.  Depending on the extent of the dust 
deposits, a weak primary explosion may cause very powerful and catastrophic 
secondary dust explosions.   
Dust explosibility hazard metrics are determined experimentally.  A frequent 
categorization is based on the dust deflagration index Kst, which represents the 
measured maximum rate of pressure rise in a standardized vessel; in other 
words the ‘dust explosion violence’ [4].  Other commonly measured hazard 
metrics are shown in Table 1. 
Fine dust is created every time the product is moved or manipulated. Because 
dust originates as an unwanted by-product of an uncontrolled process, it is 
likely to exhibit substantial variation.  Although measurements are carried out 
according to standard test conditions, measured values may exhibit 
considerable variation due to differences in moisture content, particle size 
distribution, chemical composition, and particle size.   
Kst and Pmax values of biomass powders are often over- or underestimated and 
flammability limits are not in agreement [1], [5].  Kst values of a given material, 
determined in different apparatus, may differ by factors more than 20 [4].  
Fibrous or adhesive particles pose particularly challenging as they get packed 
or trapped or agglomerate inside the injection and dispersion system of the test 
apparatus and hence influence the airborne dust concentration actually tested.  
Recent findings [6] indicate that the standard test apparatus may not distribute 
the dust evenly during test conditions. 
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According to NFPA 664 [7], a deflagration hazard exists if there is a layer of 
combustible dust about 3 mm (one eighth of an inch) or deeper on horizontal 
surfaces over 5% of the area concerned or if dust is suspended in air at a 
concentration in excess of 25% of the minimum explosible concentration 
(MEC).   
Experience has shown that dust from biomass pellets easily ignites.  Likely 
ignition sources are overheated rotating devices (ball bearing, idler, guide roller 
etc.) or an electrostatic discharge or mechanical spark, for instance from a piece 
of iron or a stone transported with the biomass.  Smoldering fires are difficult to 
detect and the smoldering particles may migrate in the band conveyor systems.  
Smoldering fires may develop into massive storage fires and cause considerable 
damage to process equipment and property [3]. 
Smoldering fires are often a source of flash fires, explosions, and secondary 
explosions. A smoldering fire can become a flash fire from wind, mechanical 
disturbance, or a fire hose as smoldering dust is dispersed into a dust cloud.  A 
smoldering fire can migrate to ignite another process stream or vessel, creating 
a flash fire, or if confined, an explosion.  Smoldering fires are notorious for 
their capacity to generate pyrolysis gasses that travel and accumulate, leading to 
flash fires or explosion hazards when firefighters attempt to attack the fire [3].  
Table 1 Selected hazard metrics for some wood type dusts 
 Hazard metric 
 For dust cloud For dust layer 
 Deflagration 
index, Kst  
 
 
Maximum 
explosive 
overpressure 
Pmax  
Minimum 
ignition ener-
gy, MIE 
Minimum 
explosible 
concentration, 
MEC 
Hot surface 
ignition tem-
perature, 
5 mm dust 
Hot surface 
ignition tem-
perature 
19 mm dust 
 (-) (MPa) (mJ) (kg m
-3
) (° C) (° C) 
Dust from wood pellets pro-
duced in British Columbia (Can-
ada)
a
 
146 0.81  17 0.070 300 260 
Dust from wood pellets pro-
duced in Nova Scotia (Canada)
a
 
162 0.84 17 0.070 310 250 
Dust from wood pellets pro-
duced in USA, southern yellow 
pine
a
 
98 0.77 20 0.025 320 270 
Cellulose
b 
66 0.93 250 0.060   
Wood dust, chipboard
b
  102 0.92  0.060   
Lignin dust
b
  208 0.87  0.015   
Peat, 15% moisture
b
  157 1.04  0.060   
a source: Melin [8],  
b source: Eckhoff [9], appendix A.1 
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2 The accident 
2.1 The facility 
The fatal explosion accident took place at Dangrønt Products A/S, Aars, 
Denmark (56° 50’ 00” N, 9° 28’ 51” E).  In the 1990s, the facility produced 
grass pellets, a commonly used fodder for livestock during the winter period.  
In May 2001, the facility expanded and began production of wood pellets.  The 
primary raw materials were wood shavings from furniture manufacturers and 
miscellaneous wood waste streams.  In addition, the company could receive the 
following palette of raw materials: waste paper; shells and cuttings from shea 
nuts and cocoa nuts; energy crops such as willow, hemp, rape straw; and 
various waste streams from the processing of grain.  The wood pellets (biomass 
pellets) were sold to the domestic stoker furnace fuel market.  The pellet 
production capacity was about 250 t d-1, or about 60 000 t y-1.  
2.2 Industrial ecology, sustainable energy 
In the context of industrial ecology and life cycle analysis (LCA), the company 
operates in a green network where waste streams from one company become 
raw materials for another company, contributing to waste minimization, closing 
material loops and optimizing environmental performance.  In the context of 
sustainable energy, biomass is a renewable and carbon dioxide neutral energy 
source with a minimal environmental footprint.  The use of environmentally 
friendly biomass pellets in home heating Stoker units is encouraged by the 
Danish environmental and energy authorities and is indirectly subsidized 
because it is exempted from various (substantial) national levies and taxes on 
energy.  
2.3 Sources 
The 2010 fatal explosion was covered in several media reports of which one 
made passing mention that another explosion had taken place in 2002.  
Information on the 2002 and 2010 explosions was requested from the Danish 
Working Environment Authority [10] and from the Police [11], [12] under the 
Danish freedom of information Act.  The dockets so obtained comprise the 
main documentary basis for this paper.  An official at the local county provided 
the company’s environmental permit and helpfully included a fire report 
produced by the local fire and rescue services. 
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2.4 The production process 
Production was organized in four steps 
1 Reception of trucks with bulk raw material, unloading and transfer to 
storage bays in building I (Figure 1) 
2 Loading of mill feed pit, milling to wood dust, transfer of wood dust to an 
intermediate storage in building II (the accident site)  
3 Loading of various grades of wood dust onto a “mixing table”, transport of 
mixed wood dust  to pelletizer units, pellet cooling unit and transfer to 
storage hoppers in building II 
Material was generally moved around using a combination of screw conveyors, 
bucket elevators, scrapers and covered band conveyors.  Front-end wheel 
loaders moved material to the mill feed pit and the wood dust mixing pit.  This 
gave flexibility to produce various grades of biomass pellets according to 
recipe.   
The intermediate storage in building II (40m x 50m) comprised 9 storage 
compartments for wood dust (Figure 2).  Each compartment was about 25 m 
long and wide enough for a wheel loader to enter, shovel up material and bring 
it to the dust mixing pit.  Wood dust was dumped into the cells from a band 
conveyor connected to a wide flexible hose that extended down to the floor to 
limit dust generation.  A sensor would raise the hose as the pile grew in size.  
This area was designated ATEX zone 22 (dusts): defined as an explosive 
atmosphere not likely to occur in normal operation and if it does occur, it will 
exist only for a short time.  Safety engineering control measures included 
extensive mechanical local exhaust ventilation, magnetic separation of tramp 
iron upstream from the mill with spark, fire detection and sprinkler system 
downstream the mill.  At the end of each shift the wheel loaders were cleaned 
with compressed air to prevent accumulations of dust. 
2.5 The explosion 
On 16 Sept. 2010, worker A was about to clean and ready his wheel loader for 
the next shift.  His colleague, worker B was busy moving wood dust to the 
mixing table with his Volvo wheel loader.  En route to compartment #7 the 
colleague drove past him at close distance.  He noticed that the Volvo had a 
burning smell and went after the colleague to alert him about the smell.  His 
intention was to stop his colleague when he reversed out of the compartment.  
He arrived at compartment #7 just when the colleague raised the wheel loader 
bucket with its load of wood dust.  He noticed a small fire about midway under 
the wheel loader. 
Within seconds the whole floor in compartment #7 was on fire and the flames 
then instantly expanded to fill the entire compartment.  There was a large bang 
and he ran back and threw himself under his own wheel loader seeking 
protection from fiber cement roofing sheets and other debris that came down.     
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A witness at the neighbor company saw a person (worker B) running with his 
clothes on fire, completely enveloped in flames.  He disappeared behind a 
corner in a trail of smoke.  She ran towards the building and found him lying on 
his back in a large pool of rain water.  His head and chest was still on fire.  She 
extinguished the fire using her jacket.  Other people came to help and they 
immediately started to dose him with water following standard first aid 
procedure for burns.  The victim said his colleague was still inside the building 
but relaxed when told the colleague was safe.  The victim was rushed with 
police escort to the trauma unit at Aalborg hospital and then airlifted by 
helicopter to the central burns unit at Rigshospitalet in Copenhagen where he 
died at 18:05.  Worker A was treated for minor facial burns at Aalborg hospital 
and was kept overnight for observation for smoke inhalation injury.  He made 
full recovery (Police docket [12]). 
2.6 Fire fighting 
The alarm call to 112 was registered at 13:07.  Dense smoke drifted towards the 
nearby road Aggersundvej which was closed for traffic.  The structural integrity 
of the building was uncertain and the fire could only be attacked from the 
outside (Figure 3, Figure 4).  Within the first half hour four large bangs were 
heard, which were later believed to be the exploding tires of the wheel loader.  
To limit fire spread the conveyor systems connecting the buildings were 
dismantled.  Thermal imaging revealed a fire inside the ventilation ducts.  Fire 
fighters were busy until the next evening at 21:00 hours, (Sept. 17), 
extinguishing numerous smoldering fires.  On Sept. 18, thermal imaging 
revealed a fire in one of the product silos.  The silo was emptied and the fire 
extinguished.  Other smoldering fires were detected and extinguished on Sept. 
20, Sept. 26 and Oct. 2nd.  On Oct. 5th, the production building was on fire with 
the roof in flames.  Undetected embers in a screw conveyor had flared up.  New 
thermal imaging revealed a smoldering fire in wood dust which had migrated 
into to the joints of the steel wall panel and mineral wool sandwich construction 
comprising the A60 firewall.  Steel panels were cut open and the fire put out.  
After nearly three weeks of firefighting efforts in mopping up and overhaul the 
fire was finally extinguished on Oct. 6th [13]. 
2.7 The wheel loader 
The wheel loader, a Volvo L70D, year 2000, was examined by a police vehicle 
inspector the next day (Figure 5).  This model is pivot controlled; articulation 
of the center hinge provides improved maneuverability for tight job sites.  The 
examination revealed that the universal joint shaft (in Europe known as a 
cardan joint shaft) that provides power transmission to the front axle was 
missing.  It was concluded that the transmission shaft had failed mechanically, 
damaging the numerous electrical cables that were routed underneath the 
chassis resulting in arcing and sparking, which had ignited the dust (Figure 6).  
The joint and shaft were later discovered under the bucket.  There were small 
signs that the shaft had been weakened by fractures near the weld zone.  These 
findings concluded the police investigation as there was no indication of 
wrongdoing, only of bad luck. 
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2.8 The aftermath 
On Sep 17, the police released a statement to mass media that the cause of the 
explosion was identified.  Due to weld failure a mechanical component broke 
loose under the vehicle and damaged electrical cables, causing a combustible 
dust explosion.  The manager of the facility expressed emotion and disbelief, as 
the facility was in full compliance with the most recent norms and guidelines; 
this explosion should not be possible. 
The Danish Working Environment Authority visited the facility on Sept. 16 and 
Sept. 17.  Concerned that non-ATEX approved wheel loaders were operating in 
an ATEX 22 location they issued an order on Sept. 22 to stop the work, 
immediately.  The Authority observed that the company’s ATEX document 
only covered fixed installations, not the wheel loader, or work operations.  The 
Authority was also concerned that the company could not present inspection 
records for the wheel loaders.  Regulations require that such vehicles are 
inspected once a year by a competent person.  The Authority therefore issued 
an order to inspect vehicles, immediately.  The Authority issued a final order, 
to ensure that work is carried out in a safe manner, immediately, and informed 
that it was considering legal action and a penalty.   
On Nov. 5, the company informed that the wood pellet production would be 
closed down permanently.  
2.9 Wheel loader parking brake design shortcoming 
In 2013, we managed to locate a highly competent and helpful mechanic at the 
local Volvo Service Centre, who had seen the accident vehicle. He suggested 
that the hollow transmission shaft could have failed due to an internal 
explosion.  The parking brake on some of the older Volvo loaders is mounted 
directly on the shaft.  If the driver forgets to release the parking brake, the 
system rapidly overheats and fails.  He had repaired many loaders with this 
failure.  The mechanic suggested that water had somehow entered the hollow 
transmission shaft and an internal steam explosion could explain the ripped 
open and torn shaft.   
We managed to locate and interview the surviving worker.  Independently, he 
also suggested that the accident was caused by an overheated parking brake.  
He suggested that an overheated red-glowing parking brake had ignited wood 
dust that is inevitably made airborne when the driver raises the bucket.  This 
was the initial small fire he observed under the accident vehicle in the 
compartment.  Likely, upon realizing that the compartment was on fire, his 
colleague had reversed full speed out of the narrow compartment and collided 
with one of the sturdy steel dividing walls, which he heard as the first bang.  
The collision impact likely overloaded the overheated and weakened 
transmission shaft, which then failed.  The mechanical failure brought the 
vehicle to a standstill and the colleague was forced to flee on foot through the 
fire inferno.   
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Figure 1 Layout of facility with Building I (raw materials) and II (intermediate 
dust storage and production) marked, other buildings are for storage of 
final product.  Numbers refer to 1) mill, 2) three pelletizer lines and 
pellet cooler, 6) silos/hoppers for final product, 7) chimney.  North is 
down.  Source: Company application for environmental permit, dated 
Jan 28, 2010 
 
 
Figure 2 Layout of Building II showing wood dust storage hall, production hall 
and hopper arrangement in between.  Accident compartment seven is 
marked.  Fat black line shows A60 firewalls.  Source: Company appli-
cation for environmental permit, dated Jan 28, 2010) 
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Figure 3 Photo taken one hour after the explosion.  The wheel loader is similar 
to the accident wheel loader, note blown out wall panels. Picture taken 
from north.  Photo courtesy: Beredskab Vesthimmerland (the local fire 
and rescue services) photo kindly provided by official of the county 
Vesthimmerland Kommune. 
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Figure 4 The many light fibre cement roofing panels that remained in place 
indicate that the explosion overpressure was modest.  Note that the 
wall made of lightweight porous concrete blocks shows no blast 
damage.  Wood dust compartment wall dividers are visible inside 
building.  Photo taken from south.  Photo courtesy: Beredskab 
Vesthimmerland (the local fire and rescue services) photo kindly 
provided by official of the county Vesthimmerland Kommune. 
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Figure 5 Examination of the wheel loader revealed that the universal (cardan) 
joint and shaft was missing.  Windows in the driver’s cabin melted in 
the intense heat.  Tires are burned away.  Source: Police investigation, 
photo in useful quality kindly provided by an official from The Danish 
Working Environment Authority.  
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Figure 6 Torn electrical cables and fire damaged hydraulic hoses.  Dotted line 
shows approximate position of missing universal (cardan) joint shaft. 
Hydraulic hoses appear intact.  
Source: Police investigation, photo in useful quality kindly provided by 
an official from The Danish Working Environment Authority 
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3 Discussion 
3.1 The immediate accident cause 
We have considered the following four accident sequences  
4 Spontaneous mechanical failure of the transmission shaft damages the 
many electrical cables that run nearby, causing short circuits and sparks 
that ignite wood dust (the official finding) 
5 Parking brake not released, water inside the overheated and weakened 
transmission shaft produces a steam explosion, the mechanical failure 
damages electrical cables which ignite wood dust 
6 Parking brake not released, pyrolysis gases from wood dust trapped inside 
the overheated and weakened transmission shaft explodes, the mechanical 
failure damages electrical cables which ignite wood dust 
7 Parking brake not released, hot surfaces on brake drum and transmission 
shaft ignite dust, later collision impact with steel wall overloads the 
weakened shaft which fails and tears cables. 
We consider option 4) the most probable and option 1) the least probable 
immediate accident cause.  The conclusion has major implications for accident 
prevention efforts because it suggests that this type of wheel loader is entirely 
unsuitable for locations where potentially explosive atmospheres of 
combustible dust or flammable vapors can be present.  We argue that the 
accident has broad learning potential because of the widespread usage of front 
loaders in combustible dust environments, the innocent nature of the human 
error and the severity of the consequence. 
3.2 The 2002 explosion 
The Dangrønt facility began production of wood pellets in May 2001.  
According to police records, the facility experienced a severe explosion on 
March 27, 2002 [11].  Information is sketchy but the police reports state that 
the roof above the wood dust storage compartments of Building II was blown 
off, roof rafters pushed upwards and disengaged from their supports, many 
rafters split open, a light concrete wall pushed outwards and a section of the 
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wall was toppled.  There was extensive fire damage to the building, mill and 
ventilation system. 
A fork lift driver was in the building at the time of the explosion.  He was 
inside the fork lift’s closed cabin; the vehicle’s front faced compartment #3, at 
distance 5-7 meters.  He was taking stock of the filling levels of the 
compartments.  Material from the hammer mill was transferred to compartment 
#3, which was almost full.  He suddenly noticed a small ember or flame in the 
compartment, which was instantly followed by a powerful explosion.  The roof 
above him disappeared and a blast wave and a fireball pushed against the fork 
lift.  Miraculously, he was unhurt and fled the scene. 
The police requested a forensic investigation which was carried out according 
to Nordic (Scandinavian) guidelines. The police’s forensic technicians 
concluded that an unidentified foreign body had entered the mill, generated a 
spark that ignited dust at the mill outlet, the explosion had then propagated 
forwards and backwards throughout the process, triggering a secondary dust 
explosion in compartment #3.  On request, the Danish Institute of Fire and 
Security Technology conducted an investigation following relevant principles 
and guidelines (Guidelines 4/99, Quality assurance system according to EN 
45004, Nordic fire investigation manual, NFPA 921, and a promulgation by the 
head of the Danish national police).  They examined the accident building, 
process equipment and the electrical installations.  No technical fault was found 
in the electrical installations which resulted in the same conclusion as the police 
– the explosion was caused by a spark.  A specialist company was called to 
examine the spark detection system, but found no technical fault.  The police’s 
interest was centered on wrongdoing and malicious intent.  The police report 
states that the fork lift driver had used no matches and was furthermore a non-
smoker ruling out him being a source of ignition.  The facilities showed no 
signs of unauthorized intrusion.  These findings concluded the police 
investigation - there was no indication of wrongdoing, only of bad luck.   
3.3 Wheel loaders acting as sources of ignition 
There appears to be a rather limited body of literature on the potential for 
powered industrial trucks (PITs), which includes forklifts and wheel loaders, to 
act as an ignition source.  Utilizing National Fire Incident Reporting System 
(NFIRS) data, Ahrens found that during 2003-2006, U.S. fire departments 
responded to an estimated annual average of 1,340 structure and vehicle fires in 
which industrial loaders, forklifts, or related material-handling vehicles were 
directly involved in ignition [14].  
Ahrens also reviewed selected published incidents from the “Firewatch” or “Bi-
monthly” columns in NFPA Journal, NFPA Alert Bulletins, and others.  At a 
recycling facility aerosol cans crushed in a compactor released flammable 
propellant vapors, which were ignited when a propane-fired forklift truck was 
started. At a paper and pulp products manufacturing facility a fire started when 
a forklift’s parking brake overheated, igniting “combustibles”, presumably 
combustible dust, under it.  About three minutes later, the LP-gas cylinder on 
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the forklift failed in boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) 
mechanism leading to fire escalation. 
We note that the availability of Ex-rated PITs on the market appears relatively 
sparse, suggesting that the demand is limited and that such vehicles are not 
commonplace.   
3.4 Insufficiently developed guidelines for hazardous 
area classification for combustible dust  
Available guidelines for hazardous area classification for combustible dust are 
not very specific.  In contrast, for flammable gasses and vapors very detailed 
experience based guidelines are available, e.g. in API RP 500/505 [15] [16] .   
The present level of knowledge on dust hazards is not sufficiently developed to 
have similar recommended zones.  For instance, the NFPA recommended 
practice 499 [17] on classification of combustible dusts and of hazardous 
locations says: “The quantity of dust released and its distance of travel are of 
extreme importance in determining the extent of a hazardous (classified) 
location. This determination requires sound engineering judgment.” (NFPA 
499 [17], section 6.8.9, emphasis added).   
The absence of detailed recommended guidelines gives ample room for 
potentially erroneous subjective individual judgment in hazardous area 
classification work. 
3.5 Inherent safe design 
Trevor Kletz was the first to clearly articulate the principles of inherent safety 
[18].  Ashford [19] later argued that inherent safety is similar in concept to 
pollution prevention.  Inherent safety, sometimes referred to as primary 
prevention, relies on preventing the possibility of an accident.  By comparison, 
secondary prevention relies on reducing the probability of an accident.  
Mitigation seeks to reduce the seriousness of the consequences, i.e. injuries and 
damage to the environment or property.  Later research has argued that inherent 
safety shares another trait with pollution prevention and cleaner production; it 
is often economically attractive [20], [21]. 
The Bhopal disaster in 1984 involved the release of about 45 t of highly 
poisonous methyl isocyanate (MIC), killing thousands, injuring tens of 
thousands and according to Indian government records, perhaps affecting up to 
half a million [22].  Kletz has argued that the most important lesson of Bhopal 
is widely overlooked: Why did the facility have two storage tanks, each with 45 
t of MIC?  MIC was not a raw material, it was not a product - it was simply an 
intermediate that permitted two factory units to operate independently of each 
other.  It was convenient to store MIC, but not essential to do so [23]. 
Following this line of reasoning a superior and inherently safer design 
philosophy at Dangrønt would be to mix the recipe of raw materials and 
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immediately process wood dust from the mill into pellets, eliminating the 
intermediate storage.  This would eliminate the hazard, a 500 t buffer storage of 
combustible dust, i.e. primary prevention.  From an organizational perspective 
[24], [25], the root cause would be a failure to address principles of inherent 
safety at the design stage; other contributing factors such as the usage of wheels 
loaders would be derived secondary unsafe practices.   
3.6 Response of the police 
We consider the 2002 explosion to be a highly significant incident as it clearly 
had multiple fatalities potential, it gave clear evidence of the inherent hazards 
of wood dust and was an opportunity to re-consider the soundness of having a 
large intermediate storage of combustible wood dust.  Both opportunities were 
missed, because the investigation was carried out by law enforcement officers 
narrowly concerned with culpability, negligence or wrongdoing.  When no 
regulations were violated and no criminal intent could be identified, the 2002 
case was closed.  There were no new insights gained.  This modus operandi 
repeated itself eight years later, again with no insights gained.  There is no 
evidence of information sharing or learning whatsoever.   
We cannot blame the police officers for not taking an industrial accident 
prevention perspective however; as it was beyond their professional capabilities 
and they did not know it was beyond them.   
3.7 Response of the Danish Working Environment 
Authority 
Despite the accident’s severity and multiple fatalities potential the Danish 
Working Environment Authority has no record of the 2002 explosion.  
Infomedia is a Danish proprietary search engine and media article repository 
that tracks about 1,900 different media in Denmark.  A search for the 2002 
explosion comes back empty.  The accident seems to have gone completely 
unnoticed in the media. 
The Authority’s response after the 2010 explosion was swift and punitive, with 
an order to stop the work and two other orders to rectify deficiencies, all orders 
of category “immediately” – the strongest enforcement action at their disposal.  
With the production facility in ruins, an order to stop the work, immediately, 
mainly has symbolic value however.  Also, an order to inspect wheel loaders 
every 12 months has little practical accident prevention impact as an inspector 
is unlikely to discover a very small defect near the weld in the universal 
(cardan) joint, a hard to reach component.  The inspection is entirely irrelevant 
if the real cause was a failure to release the hand brake, a simple human slip.  
There is no evidence of information sharing amongst workplace inspectors or 
other learning processes taking place. 
Inherent hazards, poor reporting and limited learning in the solid biomass energy sector:  a case study of a wheel loader 
igniting wood dust, leading to fatal explosion at wood pellet manufacturer 
Inherent hazards, poor reporting and limited learning in the solid biomass energy sector - wheel loader case study - preprint.docx 
22 
.  
3.8 Response of the company 
There is no evidence that the company has engaged in information sharing 
activities, for instance with other stakeholders in the biomass pellet industry.  
This is natural and only to be expected.  Milton Friedman’s dictum “The 
business of business is business” implies that spending company resources to 
investigate and report lessons learned for the benefit of others would make a 
weak business case.  Only expenses are visible; negative publicity is a concern 
and benefits are at best uncertain and intangible.  
3.9 Learning opportunities missed 
The investigation was carried out by law enforcements officials who, naturally, 
were concerned with issues of culpability, negligence and wrongdoing.  This 
narrow scope is insufficient, if not entirely misplaced, in an industrial accident 
prevention perspective.  As a result, highly significant root causes were not 
identified: 1) principles of inherent safety in design were ignored; 2) the 
hazardous area classification was very likely based on flawed reasoning; 3) the 
ATEX assessment was inadequate as it dealt only with electrical installations, 
ignoring work operations; 4) powered industrial trucks had not been recognized 
as a source of ignition; and most importantly, 5) the combustible dust hazard 
had not been given the attention it deserves.  We argue that the root causes are 
systemic shortcomings likely to be found at many other combustible dust 
workplaces, across industries.   
It is generally recognized [26] that major accidents are often preceded by 
precursors that provide faint and sometimes not so faint signals, that current 
accident prevention efforts are inadequate.  It would be a gross understatement 
to characterize the serious 2002 explosion merely as a precursor.  Yet, the 
significance of the accident was not recognized.  This is remarkable because the 
subsequent fire investigation followed “all relevant principles and guidelines”.  
We observe that the investigation was carried out in an ISO standardized one-
size-fits-all context, a checklist approach, compartmentalized, and narrowly 
concerned only with technical installations.  The systemic issues were also 
missed in the 2010 investigation.  Had the company not closed down the 
facility we may well have seen a future repeat explosion.  This time, the full 
hazard potential of wood dust, which the facility so far had escaped, could have 
materialized - a devastating explosion with multiple fatalities.  Ashford [21] 
observes that a bias in the engineering profession, a failure to address inherent 
safety and primary accident prevention, is one of the reasons why progress in 
eliminating accidents has been relatively slow.  The present case is a text book 
example of the truism that if accidents are not investigated, and root causes not 
identified, accidents recur. 
For perspective, another wood pellet facility located in Ringkøbing, Denmark, 
owned by the same company, experienced a fire three months earlier, in June 
2010.  Typical for accidents with environmentally friendly and sustainable 
biomass, there is no useful information for accident prevention professionals in 
open sources.  There is only brief mention in local newspapers [27], [28] stating 
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that the fire likely started in wood chips on a conveyor.  There were no 
casualties.  The storage building was a complete loss.  
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4 Conclusion 
By investigating and understanding the fundamental root causes of accidents, 
widely disseminating the lessons learned, and integrating these lessons learned 
into safe operations, the expanding bioenergy industries can be made much 
safer.  Evidence succinctly illustrates that biomass dust accidents are difficult to 
control.  We argue that multiple systemic issues contribute to this state of 
affairs.   
• First, dust is often an unwanted by-product resulting from product 
degradation during handling.  As such, many uncontrolled factors 
influence dust characteristics, and dust sampled today may be different 
from dust sampled tomorrow.  There are also difficulties in characterizing 
the hazardous properties of the dust. 
• Second, guidelines for hazardous area classification for combustible dust 
are undeveloped.  The absence of detailed recommended guidelines gives 
ample room for potentially erroneous subjective individual judgment in 
hazardous area classification work.   
• Third, combustible dust, although with great hazard potential, is not 
classified as a dangerous substance.  Accidents therefore fall outside the 
scope of systems designed to disseminate lessons learned and prevent 
future accidents, e.g. the EU major accident reporting system (MARS).   
Only sparse information is available in open sources to industrial accident 
prevention professionals on past accidents involving powered industrial trucks 
handling wood pellets. We consider it likely that lack of reporting is at play. 
The trend in industrial accident prevention in Denmark over the past two 
decades has been a shift away from prescriptive standards and codes that define 
specific minimum safe practices towards risk based approaches where each 
case is judged on its own merits.  For a risk-based approach to be effective, 
availability of relevant information, e.g. on past accidents, is critical - or risks 
may be scored too low, or even go unrecognized.   
Industrial accidents cannot be prevented solely through command and control 
regulatory requirements but by understanding the fundamental root causes, 
widely disseminating the lessons learned, and integrating these lessons learned 
into safe operations.  This paper presents evidence in support of the existence 
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of a substantial untapped potential for learning and information exchange.  This 
potential should be exploited for the renewable energy and environmentally 
friendly biomass pellet industry also to become sustainable from a worker 
safety perspective.   
The Polluter Pays Principle plays an important role in Danish policy.  Care 
should be taken not to misapply this principle to accident investigation and 
learning, delegating such obligations to the parties directly affected.  We argue 
it is critical to provide institutional support and to set up systems that facilitate 
learning from mishaps within the renewable energy sector.   
Utmost care should be taken to avoid media-shifting - that the resolution of a 
problem within one domain, the environmental, creates a new problem in 
another, the workplace safety domain. 
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